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ABSTRACT 
Trains tilting permits a train to travel at a high speed 
while maintaining an acceptable passenger ride quality 
with respect to the lateral acceleration, and the 
consequent lateral force, received by the passengers 
when the train travels on a curved track at a speed in 
excess of the balance speed built into the curve 
geometry.  The tilting of a train carbody is performed 
by a control and actuation system which operates as a 
closed servoloop accepting  the commands from the 
train control system, generating the torque necessary to 
tilt the carbody with respect to the bogie and measuring 
the tilt angle to close the control loop.  Measurement of 
the tilt angle of each train vehicle is performed by two 
sensors located in the front and rear part of the vehicle.  
Since a correct tilt angle measurement is vital for the 
system operation and for ensuring a safe ride, in case of 
discrepancy between the signals of the two tilt angle 
sensors of any vehicle, the tilting operation is disabled 
and the train speed is reduced.   An innovative tilt angle 
sensors health management system is herein presented 
that makes intelligent use of all available information 
to allow detection of malfunctioning of an individual 
tilt angle sensor, thereby enabling a continued 
operation of the tilting system and a high speed travel 
after a sensor failure occurs. * 
1. THE TILTING TRAINS 
Tilting trains perform car body tilting towards curve’s 
                                                 
* Jacazio et al.: This is an open-access article distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States 
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
are credited. 
inner side, to reduce centrifugal force in curves at 
passengers’ level and, therefore, to maintain a better or 
equivalent passenger comfort with respect to the lateral 
acceleration (and the consequent lateral force) on same 
curves’ geometry at enhanced service speed.  By tilting 
the carbody of a rail passenger vehicle relative to the 
track plane during curve negotiation, it is therefore 
possible to operate at speeds higher than might be 
acceptable to passengers in a non-tilting vehicle, and 
thus reduce overall trip time. The recognized advantage 
of tilting trains is to increase the achievable service 
speed for passenger trains on existing tracks without 
being forced to invest very large sums of money to 
build a dedicated new track or to alter the geometry of 
the existing curves (Boon, Hayes 1992).  Both 
hydraulic and electromechanical actuation systems have 
been used to provide the controlled force necessary to 
tilt the carbodies of the train vehicles.  The first tilting 
trains used hydraulic actuation technology, then the 
preference seemed to veer towards electromechanical 
actuation, but the most recent tilting trains make again 
use of hydraulic actuation systems.   
The hydraulic actuation systems consist of hydraulic 
linear actuators accepting the controlled hydraulic flow 
from hydraulic power generation units located at the 
center of each train vehicle, with each hydraulic power 
generation unit consisting of an electrically driven 
pump, accumulator, reservoir, filters and a complement 
of control and protection valves.   The carbody tilt 
angle of each train vehicle is measured by two angular 
position sensors. 
A concept schematic of a hydraulic power 
generation and position control system for tilting trains 
is shown in Fig. 1. 
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Each train vehicle has its own hydraulic power 
generation and control unit (HPGCU) located in a 
central position, four hydraulic actuators for carbody 
tilting and the pipework interconnecting the actuators 
with the HPGCU. The hydraulic actuators for carbody 
tilting are placed near the front and rear end of the 
vehicle, on the right and left side, and operate in a 
push-pull arrangement with the left actuators extending 
while the right actuators retracting, or viceversa, 
depending on the direction of the commanded titl 
angle.   
The HPGCU contains all the components necessary 
to generate and control the pressurized fluid flow to the 
hydraulic actuators, to control the cleanliness and the 
temperature of the hydraulic fluid and to provide 
protection in case of malfunctioning of any component. 
In particular, the pressurized fluid flow is provided by 
an electrically driven, pressure compensated, variable 
delivery pump. The control of the flows to the carbody 
actuators is performed by an electrohydraulic 
servovalve which is the power modulating component 
for the carbody position servoloop.   
The carbody tilt angle of each train vehicle is 
commanded by the train electronics as a function of the 
lateral acceleration, and a position servoloop is created 
for each vehicle in which the commands are compared 
with the actual tilt angle in order to close the position 
feedback loop.  The servoloop position errors are 
processed by an appropriate control law that eventually 
generates the input signals to the controlling 
servovalves. 
The control loop is single-hydraulic, dual-electrical 
and uses a single electrohydraulic servovalve with 
independent electrical coils accepting the control 
currents from the two independent control computers.  
Each computer interfaces with one of the two tilt angle 
sensors and mutually exchanges with the other 
computer the information on the angle position and 
current values as well as the computer health status.  
Each computer can thus generate an equal consolidated 
position feedback based on the average of the two tilt 
angle sensors signals, or can use the remaining single 
signal after a tilt angle sensor failure has been 
recognized and the signal from that sensor is then 
ignored.   
The control law (Fig.2) is based on a PID controller 
with a relatively low value of the integrator gain and a 
stauration on the integrator output.  The function of the 
integrator is in fact to compensate for the steady state, 
or slow varying servovalve offsets, while the dynamic 
performance is dependent on the proportional and 
derivative gains of the control law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. THE POSITION SENSORS 
Different types of position sensors can in principle be 
used for measuring the tilt angle of the carbody;  
however, environmental, interface and cost issues limit 
the choice of sensors to very few types.  Eventually, 
capacitive transducers have been typically used for 
measuring the tilt angle of the carbody and this paper 
makes thus reference to these transducers.  
Although these sensors proved to be suitable to 
measure the carbody tilt angle and  have a fairly good 
reliability record in revenue service, a critical issue for 
them is a difficulty in implementing monitoring logics 
able to recognize all type of  their possible failures.  
Failures such as a broken wire or a short circuit lead to 
an out of scale signal and can be easily detected by a 
monitoring logic, but other malfunctionings such as 
degradations originating variations of the scale factor, 
or increased offsets are more subtle events that cannot 
be detected by the normal monitoring routines.   
In order to counter the possibility of an undetected 
sensors failure, the existing tilting trains have their 
vehicles equipped with dual redundant sensors, hence a 
comparison between the two sensors can be made. An 
anomalous behaviour of one of them will thus originate 
a difference between the output signals of the two 
sensors and an alert is generated by the monitoring 
logic. 
Figure 1: Concept schematic of a hydraulic power
generation and position control system for
tilting trains 
Figure 2: Concept block diagram of  the tilt angle 
control law 
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3. CRITICAL ISSUES WITH THE PRESENT 
TECHNIQUES FOR ASSESSING THE 
SENSORS HEALTH 
The techniques implemented by the tilting trains 
manufacturers for detecting failures of the carbody 
sensors are normally based on two checks: 
 Verification that the output signal of the sensor is 
within a valid range 
 Comparison between the output signals of the two 
redundant sensors 
In case the first check indicates that the signal of 
one of the two sensors is out of range, that  sensor is 
recognized as failed.  In case the output signals of the 
two sensors are within the valid range, but differ from 
each other, a failure is recognized, but it is not possible 
to determine which sensor is healthy and which is 
failed.  In this case, the position feedback, which is 
obtained by performing the average of the two sensors 
output signals, is obviously corrupted and the position 
control loop does not work any longer.  The system 
operation is hence disabled, which entails the loss of 
tilting capability of the train and the reduction of the 
train speed to ensure a comfortable and safe travel, but 
with the penalty of a service delay.   
For the cases for which the monitoring logic 
actually detects which of the two sensors is failed, the 
carbody tilting operation could in principle continue 
because the signal of the failed sensor can be discarded 
and the position control loop of the carbody tilt angle 
can continue using the feedback signal of the remaining 
healthy sensor.  Though this is possible, preference is 
given to anyhow disable the carbody tilting operation 
and reduce the train speed after a sensor failure also if 
the failed sensor has been identified and isolated.  The 
rationale is that in the event of a subsequent undetected 
failure of the remaining tilt angle sensor of the same 
vehicle, an uncontrolled carbody tilt angle would be 
originated.  Though an undetected failure of the second 
sensor of a train vehicle after a failure of the first 
sensor during a single train ride is a very improbable 
event, still this combination of failures could lead to 
hazardous conditions, hence the carbody tilting is 
disabled after a first failure of any of  its tilt angle 
sensors. 
The tilting trains in revenue service have different 
compositions, with the number of vehicles ranging 
from three to ten; if we consider a medium-size train 
comprised of seven vehicles, each vehicle equipped 
with two tilt angle sensors, it turns out that the failure 
of any of its 14 tilt angle sensors brings about the loss 
of the train tilting capability.   
The capacitive type sensors used to measure the tilt 
angle are very reliable devices, therefore, the 
probability of loosing the tilting operation as a 
consequence of a tilt angle sensor is in the end low, 
still, improvements are encouraged to devise ways of 
preventing the failure of any single sensor from forcing 
to disable the carbody tilting function. 
A first possibility is of course to add one sensor and 
thus have each train vehicle provided with three tilt 
angle sensors.  This solution would allow the possibility 
of performing a majority voting among the three 
sensors to identify the failed one and would still leave a 
redundancy after a first sensor failure, thereby entailing 
an unabated operation after the failure.  This solution is 
working in principle, but besides the penalty of adding 
a sensor and the associated wiring in each vehicle, a 
problem exists on how to manage the third sensor 
signal.  The train electronics is in fact based on a dual 
architecture in which each of the two equal, but 
independent electronic sections interface with their 
sensors and mutually exchange informations.  If one of 
the two electronic sections is modified to accept and 
process the signal of and additional sensor, that would 
make the two sections different with several negative 
implications on overall system architecture, logistics, 
maintenance and costs. 
In order to keep a symmetrical architecture with two 
equal electronic sections a quadruplex sensors 
configuration should be introduced, with two sensors 
interfacing with one electronic section and the other 
two sensors with the other electronics.  This solution 
would be the optimal from the operational point of 
view, but would double the total number of sensors 
with their associated electrical harness.  For a 7-train 
vehicle the sensor number would increase from 14 to 28 
bringing about a large additional cost and a decrease of 
the logistic reliability. 
 
4. SENSORS ADVANCED HEALTH 
MANAGEMENT 
The advanced technique herein presented was devised 
for being applied to legacy systems; it does not require 
any hardware modification, but it makes a better use of 
the available signals to enhance the ability of detecting 
an anomalous behaviour of the tilt angle sensors, 
allowing the carbody tilting operation to continue after 
a sensor failure.  Of course, the existing sensors 
monitors outlined at the beginning of section 3 of this 
paper still remain; the advanced monitoring technique 
is intended as an additional procedure able to better 
identify any failure of a sensor, thereby providing the 
ability to always sort out which  of the two sensors of a 
carbody is failed, and to enable the detection of a sensor 
failure also after the other sensor of the same carbody 
has already failed.  This will allow the carbody tilting 
function to continue after a first failure of a tilt angle 
sensor. 
The advanced sensors health management makes 
use of two parallel and simultaneous procedures:  
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 Sensors modeling 
 Sensors correlation 
The sensors modeling is a local process which is 
performed for each individual vehicle, while the 
sensors correlation is a global process which makes use 
of the signals of the sensors of all vehicles.  The results 
of these two procedures are then fused by a decision 
maker, which eventually provides the sensors health 
status to the train control system.  The information will 
thus be available on whether the tilting operation can 
continue or must be disabled and the train speed 
reduced.    
A concept flow chart of the sensors health 
management process is shown in Fig. 3.  This flow 
chart makes reference to the case of a 7-vehicle train, 
but its principle can be applied to a train with any 
number of vehicles.  
The following sections outline the sensors 
modeling, correlation and decision making procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. SENSORS MODELING 
The sensors modeling is comprised of three processes 
that are performed for each train vehicle: a coherence 
check, a learning process and a monitoring process.  
The logic flow chart for these three processes relevant 
to the sensors modeling is shown in Fig. 4. 
The signals A and B provided by the two tilt angle 
sensors of a vehicle carbody are first checked to verify 
that they are in their valid range of 4 to 20 mA.  In case 
the electrical output signal is outside this range a 
failure of that sensor is recognized and its  signal is 
discarded and the train tilting continues using the 
remaining sensor to close the tilt angle feedback loop. 
If  both signals A and B pass the valid range check, 
they are compared to each other. If their difference is 
below an acceptable threshold, a signals coherence and 
hence a good health status is recognized; however, if a 
difference about the threshold prevails and lasts more 
than a given time, a lack of signals coherence is 
detected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the two tilt angle sensors of a vehicle are 
placed on the front and rear bogie, a transient difference 
can be originated by the carbody skew when the vehicle 
enters or exits a curve.  Since a curved track has a cant 
increasing with the track curvature, a carbody skew 
develops when the track curvature is not constant, as it 
occurs at the beginning and end of a curve.  Based on 
an analysis of the operational data, the threshold for 
recognizing lack of coherence was set at ΔϑTH  = 1° for 
more than δt0 = 1.5 s.    When lack of coherence is 
detected, the issue is to understand which of the two 
sensors is good and which is failed.  The detection of 
the failed sensor is performed by the monitoring 
process, that uses a system model to analyze the 
coherence between input and output signals as it will be 
outlined in the following of this section.  The same 
monitoring process is also performed to check the 
health status of the remaining sensor after a failure of 
the other sensor of the same vehicle.  In fact, not all 
failures or malfunctionings of a sensor can be detected 
by the valid range check performed on its output signal. 
The basic idea behind the sensors modeling process is 
that for a hydraulic actuation system, servovalve 
current, flow rate and actuator  load make up a set of 
three interrelated variables: if two of them are known, 
the third one can be determined. Models of servovalve 
controlled electrohydraulic systems are shown in the 
literature (Borello, Dalla Vedova, Jacazio, Sorli  2009),  
(Byington, Watson, Edwards, Stoelting 2004). For the 
hydraulic actuation systems of tilting trains the 
previously three referenced variables are either known, 
or can be determined from the available information 
without additional sensors, as it will be discussed in the 
following.  
The servovalve current is a known quantity because 
Figure 3:  Concept flow chart of the sensors health 
management process 
Figure 4:  Flow chart for the processes relevant to the 
sensors modeling 
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it is generated by the control system itself.    
The flow rate is the product of the actuators area 
times their speed.  The actuator area is a design 
parameter, while the actuator speed can be determined 
by performing two computational steps.  Firstly, the tilt 
angle measured by the relevant sensors must be 
converted into actuators position taking into account 
the kinematic ratio between tilt angle and actuator 
position, which is a non-linear function of the tilt angle 
itself.  Secondly, the time derivative of the actuators 
position is performed to compute the actuators speed 
and hence the flow rate.  The kinematics of the tilting 
system is shown in the diagram of Fig. 5.  The carbody 
is connected to the bogie by means of two hinged links, 
thereby making up a four-bar linkage mechanism.  Two 
single-effect hydraulic actuators have their pistons 
hinged to the carbody and their cylinders hinged to the 
bogie.  The combination of the two single-effect 
actuators is equivalent to a single double effect 
actuator; therefore, when a new position command is 
given, one actuator extends while the other one retracts 
and the carbody angle changes according to the four-
bar linkage kinematics.  By indicating with γ  the 
angular speed of the carbody, A the actuators area, b1, 
b2 the actuators arms with respect to the instantaneous 
velocity center CV, the absolute values of the actuators 
flow rates are: 
Q1 = b1Aγ 
Q2 = b2Aγ 
The signs of  Q1  and Q2 depend on whether the 
actuator is extending or retracting.  The actuators arms 
b1 and b2 are not constant, but are a known function of 
the tilt angle ϑ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The torque T developed by the total of the two 
actuators about the instantaneous velocity center CV is 
given by: 
T = p1b1A − p2b2A 
where p1 and p2 are the pressures in the two 
actuators. 
The torque T developed by the actuators must 
balance the sum of two contributions: 
The moment MW of the carbody weight with respect 
to CV, which depends on the carbody mass and on the 
distance between the carbody weight vector and CV.  
This distance is a known function of the carbody tilt 
angle ϑ, since it is determined by the four-bar linkage 
kinematics. 
The friction torque TF, acting in the direction 
opposite to the carbody angular speed. 
The actuators flows are controlled by a single 
electrohydraulic servovalve which modulates the areas 
of the two equal metering ports proportionally to the 
control current i.  The flow rates  Q1  and Q2 are then a 
function of both the control current i and of the pressure 
drop through the relevant metering port.  When actuator 
1 is extending and actuator 2 is retracting, the flow rates 
are given by: 
( )11 ppikQ SV −=  
( )RV ppikQ −= 22  
where pS and pR are the supply and return pressures 
and kV is a flow coefficient depending on the servovalve 
metering ports geometry and on the hydraulic fluid 
properties. 
By combining Eqs. (1) through (3) and taking into 
account the definitions of  MW  and TF, the following 
relationships can be obtained which relate angular 
speed γ, control current i and carbody weight moment 
MW: 
For an opposing load condition: 
 
 
 
 
For an aiding load condition: 
 
 
 
 
An opposing load condition occurs when the 
absolute value of the tilt angle ϑ  increases, and aiding 
load condition prevails for the opposite case.  It is 
important to notice that the control law of the tilt angle 
servoloop consists of a PI controller in which the 
control is essentially performed by the proportional 
gain, while the integrator gain has a small value, it has a 
saturation and its purpose is to cancel out the effects of 
the steady state errors that are originated by the 
servovalves offsets. By this way, the effects of the 
servovalve offsets are eliminated and the servovalve is 
centered in its hydraulic null when the servoloop error 
is zero. The current i of all equations of this paper is 
thus the current determined by the proportional gain, 
which actually determines the servovalve opening, 
(1)
(2)
Figure 5:  Diagram of the carbody tilting system 
kinematics 
(4)
(5)
( )( )32313 21 bbA
TMAbpbp
ik FWRSV +
−−−=γ  
( )( )32313 21 bbA
TMAbpbpik FWRSV +
−+−=γ  
p2Q2
BOGIE
CARBODY
Cv
G
p1 Q1
b2b1
(3)
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while the contribution to the current given by the 
integrator gain exactly matches the servovalve offset. 
Equations (4) and (5) make up the basis for the 
sensors monitoring.  The supply and return pressures pS 
and pR are known since the servovalve is connected to a 
constant pressure system and discharges the flow to a 
resevoir open to the atmospheric pressure.  The 
actuator area A and the valve flow gain kV are known 
parameters determined by the components geometry.  
The friction torque TF is a quantity that depends on the 
frictional losses occurring during the carbody rotation 
and is also a known quantity.  The actuators moments 
arms b1 and b2, and the weight moment MW are 
quantities depending on known physical parameters 
and on the tilt angle ϑ. Therefore, the principle for the 
monitoring process is the following. 
Starting from the value of ϑ obtained from the tilt 
angle sensor, the values of  b1, b2, and MW  are 
computed, which are introduced in the expressions of 
Eqs. (4) and (5) together with the value of the current i, 
which is known since it is generated by the control  
system itself.  As a result, the values of the expressions 
on the right-hand sides of Eqs. (4) and (5) are 
determined.  The value of the carbody angular speed γ  
is determined by calculating the time derivative of the 
tilt angle ϑ and a comparison can thus be made 
between the values obtained for the two sides of Eqs. 
(4) and (5).  The difference between these values is 
within a normal tolerance range for a correct system 
operation, but a sensor failure causes a loss of 
coherence between the same values, and a failure can 
hence be recognized as it will be described later in this 
section. 
The values of  the actuators arms b1, b2 and the 
actuators area A are well defined quantities depending 
on the geometry of the system components and do not 
change.  The servovalve flow coefficient kV  may have 
some variations due to differences of the hydraulic 
fluid temperature.  Such variations, however, are small 
since the the hydraulic power generation unit is 
provided with a thermal control system which limits 
the temperature variations of the hydraulic fluid.   On 
the contrary, the friction torque TF is subjected to 
greater variations: different environment temperatures, 
as well as wear and usage bring about changes of the 
friction coefficients and of the drag torque.   
The weight moment MW  can also vary within a 
certain range for the same value of the tilt angle ϑ. In 
fact, the actual mass of the tilted mass is the sum of the 
mass of the carbody and of the payload.  While the 
carbody mass  is constant, that of the payload is 
variable.  The monitoring logic can work with a typical 
average values of these variable quantities, but in order 
to get a better accuracy and increase the robustness of 
the monitoring, an identification logic was defined 
allowing to assess the values of the friction torque and 
of the total carbody + payload mass.  The entire sensors 
modeling thus consists of two modes: learning and 
monitoring. 
The learning process takes place when the two tilt 
angle sensors are both active and the difference 
between their output signals is below an established 
threshold, which occurs when the system operates 
normally.  While in this condition, for which a normal 
operation is recognized, the system of two equations (4) 
and (5) can be worked out to determine the values of TF 
and MW for each tilt angle ϑ.   
When the train negotiates a curve, a tilt angle is 
commanded, that is followed by a command back to 
zero when the train exits the curve.  While the tilt angle 
is increasing, the opposing load condition (4) prevails, 
while the aiding load condition (5) prevails when the 
tilt angle decreases.  Therefore, the learning algorithm 
works in the following way. 
When the train enters a curve and the tilt angle 
increases, the algorithm uses Eq. (4) to compute the 
value of (-MW - TF) based on the value of the current i 
and on thoseof  γ, b1 and b2 which are determined from 
the consolidated value ϑ of the tilt angle.  This is in turn 
obtained from the mean value of the signals generated 
by the two tilt angle sensors.  When the train exits the 
curve, the value of (MW - TF) is computed in the same 
way from Eq. (5).  Since no changes of mass and 
frictional losses occur in the short time interval between 
entering and leaving a curve, by knowing (-MW - TF) 
and (MW - TF) for the same value of ϑ  it is possible to 
find out the values of MW  and TF. 
The computed values of MW  and TF are stored in a 
memory for each value of tilt angle ϑ, and a moving 
average is then performed which adapts the values of 
MW  and TF to the variations that can occur in service.   
The above described learning process occurs only 
when the tilt absolute value of the angle rate γ  is above 
a minimum threshold γT, since very small tilt angle rate 
could lead to less accurate results.  The learning process 
concept block diagram is shown in Fig. 6. 
If a difference between the signals of the two tilt 
angle sensors of the same carbody above an established 
threshold ΔϑTH is detected, and that difference lasts 
more than a given time δt0, or if only one sensor is 
active, then the learning process is discontinued and the 
modeling process reverts to the monitoring process. 
The logic for the monitoring mode is described by the 
block diagram of Fig. 7.   
In the monitoring process, the actual tilt rates γTA 
and γTB resulting from the tilt angle signals ϑA and ϑB 
generated by the two tilt angle sensors are compared 
with the tilt rates γMA and γMB computed from the system 
model described in first part of this section, and by 
using the last values of MW and TF determined in the 
course of the learning process.  The absolute value |δγ| 
Annual Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society, 2010 
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of the difference between actual and computed tilt 
angle rate is processed by a filtering element whose 
purpose is to eliminate undesired noise in the 
monitoring process. The filtering element sets its 
output e equal to |δγ| only when |δγ| is greater than a 
minimum value γB.  This prevents differences resulting 
from the inaccuracies of the  modeling process to be 
counted as errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The resulting errors e1 and e2  for the two tilt angle 
sensors are then integrated with time.  In case of sensor 
failure or malfunctioning, the relevant integrator output 
(IA or IB) grows faster than the other, and by looking at 
which of the two outputs (IA or IB) is greater, it is 
possible to sort out which is the failed sensor. 
This monitoring logic is activated when both 
sensors are active and a difference between their two 
signals has been detected and positively confirmed; 
therefore, it is possible to rapidly understand which of 
the two sensors is failed.  It must be emphasized that 
for this condition the monitor does not compare  the 
computed value of a certain quantity against an 
acceptable limit and has to decide whether a failure has 
occurred or not.  The monitor already knows that a 
failure exists and simply compares two quantities (IA 
and IB) to realize which of the two sensors is failed.   In 
this condition, there is an extremely low probability of 
error: the quantity I relevant to the failed sensor will 
definitely be greater than that for the healthy one and 
the failed sensor can be positively identified with 
practically zero error probability.   
When only one sensor is active because the other 
one was recognized failed, the monitoring process 
continues for the remaining healthy one using the last 
values of MW and TF determined in the course of the 
learning process.   Obviously, in this case it is not 
possible to compare the signals of the two sensors.  
Therefore, the monitoring logic relies on comparing the 
time integral of the absolute value of the error e 
resulting from the filtered difference between the actual 
γA and computed γM tilt rates with a limit threshold IMAX.  
When the integrator output I  becomes greater than IMAX 
a failure is recognized.   
Since the monitoring process is meaningful only 
when the vehicle carbody is commanded to tilt, the 
integrators outputs (IA and IB) are reset to zero when the 
train leaves a curve and travels again on a straight track, 
hence the tilt angle command is again equal to zero.  
This instruction prevents that occasional disturbances, 
not related to sensors malfunctionings, are 
progressively added by the integrator and possibly 
generate a false alarm. 
Since the monitoring process implemented when 
only a single sensor is less accurate than the one for the 
case of two sensors active, the limit IMAX beyond which 
a sensor failure is recognized cannot be set too low to 
minimize the risk of false alarms.  This, however, 
leaves room for a greater possibility of missed failures 
than for the case of two sensors active.  A particular 
concern is that this monitor, which is based on the 
integration of an error with time, is not as fast as 
necessary to pick up sudden large failures which could 
lead to transient highly uncomfortable riding 
conditions.  In order to improve the overall robustness 
of the sensors health monitoring system, a correlation 
process is run in parallel to the modeling process to 
provide a redundant information on the sensors health.   
 
6. SENSORS CORRELATION 
The basis of the correlation process is that when a train 
negotiates a curve all the train vehicles receive in 
sequence equal tilt angle commands, albeit delayed of 
amounts equal to the ratio between vehicle length and 
train speed.   Since all vehicles are equal with only 
minor mass differences, there is an almost equal time 
history of their servovalve currents as the vehicles enter 
and leave a curve.   A concept flow chart of the 
correlation process is shown in Fig. 8, referring to a 7-
Figure 6:  Concept block diagram of the learning 
process 
Figure 7:  Concept block diagram of the monitoring 
process  
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vehicle train.  There is a total of 5 correlators, each 
receiving the tilt commands and the control currents 
from three consecutive vehicles. Each correlator 
peforms the functions indicated in the diagram of Fig. 
9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The basic principle of the sensors correlation is to 
evaluate the time integral of the servovalve current  of 
each vehicle servoactuator from the beginning to the 
end of the transition curve.  It is known that the passage 
from a straight track to a fixed radius curved track 
occurs along a transition curve, with progressively 
increasing curvature, often consisting of a clothoid 
spiral.  This track alignment is instrumental in reducing 
the rate of change of lateral acceleration, known as 
lateral jerk, which is a cause of passengers discomfort.  
All train vehicles are approximately equal and are 
subjected to equal tilt commands, therefore, the 
servovalves currents must be approximately equal and 
only shifted in time according to the train speed.  While 
the train is traveling on a straight track and the tilt 
angle command is equal to zero, the value of the current 
integral H for each vehicle is set equal to 0.  As the 
train enters into a curved track and the absolute value of 
the tilt angle command is greater than ϑTH, a routine is 
activated to compute the time integral of the absolute 
value of the filtered servovalve current iF:  
 
 
 
The servovalve current filter simply sets to zero all 
values of the current below a threshold iTH.  This is 
instrumental in minimizing the disturbance created by 
the servovalve current noise.   As each vehicle travels 
along the transition curve and it is subjected to an 
increasing lateral acceleration, the tilt angle command 
increases until reaching a steady state value when the 
transistion curve ends and the vehicle travels along a 
constant curvature track.  When this condition is 
attained the computation of the time integral of the 
servovalve current is stopped since the servovalve 
current falls to a low value and it becomes little 
significant. No flow is required by the actuators in that 
condition and the servovalve is away from its hydraulic 
null of only the small amount necessary to create the 
actuators pressure differential necessary to balance the 
moment of the vehicle weight in the tilted condition.   
Small disturbances of the servovalve current that occur 
in absolutely normal conditions could thus give an 
unwanted contribution to the value of H , thereby 
increasing the probability of nuisance errors signaling. 
Simultaneously to stopping the computation of the 
time integral H of the servovalve current, an enable 
signal is activated for transmitting the computed value 
of H to the sort and consolidation routine, while the 
value of the integrator is reset to zero to make it ready 
for the next computation.  The sort and consolidation 
routine of each correlator accepts as an input the values 
of H for three consecutive vehicles.  As the newly 
computed value of H of third vehicle in line is received, 
the sort routine places the three values of Hn in an 
ascending order and takes the intermediate one as the 
consolidated value Hcons.  Each individual value Hn is 
then compared with the consolidated value Hcons by a 
voting algorithm performing the following correlation 
check: 
 
 
 
 
If this correlation check is positive, a healthy sensor 
status is set to good; in the opposite case is set to bad. 
For a 7-vehicle train this process is performed by 
five correlators as schematically shown in the diagram 
of Fig. 8.  The outputs of all five correlators are sent to 
the decision maker. 
 
Figure 8:  Concept block diagram of the sensors 
correlation logic 
dtiH F∫=  (6)
H
H
HH
cons
consn δ≤−  (7)
Figure 9:  Correlator functions 
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7. DECISION MAKER 
The decision maker consists of a logic routine 
accepting the output signals from sensors modeling and 
correlation processes to provide the information of the 
sensors health status to the train control system.   A 
concept flow chart of the decision maker is shown in 
Fig. 10.   
 
 
The decision maker works as follows.  For each 
vehicle the decision maker receives the status (good / 
fail)  of the two sensors (A, B) from the sensors 
modeling process and the correlation status (good / 
bad) from the correlation process and takes the 
following decisions. 
If A and B status are "good" and the correlation 
signal is "good", the health status is set to "good". 
If A and B status are "good" and the correlation 
signal is "bad", a warning is generated of an anomalous 
tilt system behaviour. In fact, this condition is not the 
result of a sensors error since both sensors are good, 
but can be originated by malfunctionings of the tilt 
system of that vehicle, such as a degradation of the 
servovalve performance, or an anomalous increase of 
the friction torque during the carbody tilting.  The 
tilting operation can continue since the commanded tilt 
angle are attained, but the warning signal alerts the 
maintenance crew that some part of the tilt system of 
that vehicle operates outside its normal conditions. 
If either A or B status is "fail" and the correlation 
signal is "good", a warning is generated of a sensor 
failure is issued.  The tilting operation can continue 
since the commanded tilt angle are attained, but the 
warning signal alerts the maintenance crew of the 
failure of a specific sensor which must be replaced. 
If either A or B status is "fail" and the correlation 
signal is "bad", an alarm signal is generated indicating 
the loss of tilt angle measurement capability.  Upon 
receiving the alarm signal the train control system will 
disable the tilting function and reduce the train speed to 
a safe and comfortable value for the passengers.  
If both A and B status is "fail" the tilt angle 
measurement capability is lost and an alarm signal is 
generated as in the previous case.   
 
8. ASSESSMENT OF THE SENSORS HEALTH 
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
The merits of the sensors health management system 
described in this paper were assessed by injecting 
different types of failures and degradations in a 
comprehensive model of a 7-vehicle tilting train 
traveling along different tracks.  In particular, all data 
refer to the Neitech tilting train developed by Alstom, 
which has been in revenue service in the past ten year 
for the german railways.  The maximum tilt angle is 8° 
and the maximum tilt rate is 5°/s; the flow to the 
actuators is controlled by a servovalve with a rated 
current of 40 mA. 
The mathematical model of the tilting train used for 
the simulations is a physical based model in which all 
system components are described by the mathematical 
relationships among the state variables and the physical 
parameters.  The model was developed for describing 
the behaviour of the train tilting systems and proved to 
be very accurate when later compared with the data 
measured during revenue service operations.  Figure 11 
shows an example of comparison between model 
results and test data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Decision maker flow chart 
Figure 11:  Mathematical model accuracy 
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Figure 12:  Focus on Battipaglia-Reggio Calabria 
track 
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Taking advantage of this model, simulations were 
then run to check the ability of the sensors health 
management to recognize sensors failures and the 
possibility of generating false alarms.  The simulations 
start with default values of the system parameters 
stored in the health management routines and with 
actual parameters  different from the default ones.  As 
the simulation progresses the learning process 
recognizes the actual values and consequently updates 
those used for the monitoring process. 
The simulations were run using the time histories of 
tilt angle commands for a train traveling along tracks 
creating  medium and severe duty cycles for the tilt 
control system.  The medium duty cycle refers to a 
track in southern Italy, from Battipaglia to Reggio 
Calabria (Fig. 13), while the severe duty cycle refers to 
a track in central Germany, from Lichtenfels to 
Saafeld, (Fig. 14).  The simulations duly took into 
account the difference of tilt angles measured by the 
sensors placed on the front and the rear of the same 
vehicle due to the vehicle skew resulting from the 
variable curvature of the transition curve. The amount 
of vehicle skew is a function of the rate of change of 
the track curvature and of the vehicle stiffness and has 
a maximum value of 1.5° for the train taken as a 
reference for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to reproduce with the maximum possible 
accuracy the range of conditions that could actually 
occur in revenue service, normal variations of the 
system parameters from their nominal values were 
introduced in the system model.  
Firstly, a difference up to ±5% of nominal average 
was randomly assumed for the mass of each vehicle 
and a difference up to ±20% of nominal average was 
randomly assumed for the friction torque.  
Secondly, variations of the servovalve offset that 
occur under normal operating conditions due to the 
variations of parameters such as return pressure and 
temperature of the hydraulic fluid were introduced.  
The servovalve offset was accounted for by adding a 
disturbance current io defined as the sum of three 
terms: 
io = io1 +  io2 + io3 
In this equation io1 is a constant offset equal to 2% of 
the rated current.  The second term io2 is a short term 
variation of the servovalve offset and was assumed to 
occur as a step, reach a maximum of ±3% of the rated 
current, last up to 2 s and be repeated with a time 
interval up to 10 s according to a random pattern.  The 
third term is a long term variation of the offset, which is 
mainly related to fluid temperature changes.  It was 
assumed to take place as a ramp variation, have a 
maximum of ±5% of the rated current, last up to a 
minute and occur in a random way. 
Thirdly, a random noise with a maximum amplitude 
of ±0.3% of the full scale signal was added to the 
output signal of each tilt angle sensor.  This noise level 
was actually observed in actual operation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Train rides along the two above referenced tracks 
were simulated with the simultaneous presence of the 
disturbances previously outlined and thresholds 
activating monitors and alarms were established to 
make sure that no false alarm would be generated when 
the system parameters were in their normal range.  The 
following settings were eventually established which 
proved to be safe to prevent false alarms over for any 
possible adverse combination of the system parameters 
values in their normal range. 
 Tilt rate threshold γL for activation of the learning 
process = 1°/s  (Fig. 6) 
 Dead band γB on the tilt rate input error of the 
monitoring process = 1°/s  (Fig. 7) 
 Lack of coherence threshold ΔϑTH for the two 
sensors signals of the same carbody = 1° 
 Persistance time δt0 above coherence threshold 
necessary to activate the monitoring process = 1.5 s 
Figure 13:  Time sequence of tilt angle commands 
for  a portion of the Battipaglia - Reggio 
Calabria track 
Figure 14:  Time sequence of tilt angle commands for 
a portion of the Lichtenfels - Saafeld track
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
-10
-5
0
5
10
Time [s]
Ti
lt 
A
ng
le
 [°
]
Battipaglia - Reggio Calabria
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
-10
-5
0
5
10
Time [s]
Ti
lt 
A
ng
le
 [°
]
Lichtenfels - Saafeld
(8)
Annual Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society, 2010 
 11 
 Time limit for comparing the integrators outputs IA, 
IB of the monitoring process for the condition of the 
two sensors active = 2 s 
 Limit value IMAX of the time integral of the tilt rate 
error  (γT  - γM)  = 2° 
 Tilt command threshold ϑTH for activation of the 
correlator function = 0.5° 
 Current threshold iTH for the servovalve current 
filter = 4 mA 
 Limit for positive correlation check δH = 0.1 
Once these limits were established and proven 
effective, failures and degradations of the sensors were 
introduced.  In particular, the following 
malfunctionings were considered: 
 Sudden loss or short of sensor signal 
 Changes of sensor signal offset 
 Variations of sensor signal sensitivity 
 Change of sensor linearity error 
 Sensor signal instability 
Offset and sensitivity variations were simulated 
both as sudden or slow varying processes.  The 
simulations were run first starting from a normal 
condition (all sensors operating), then from a condition 
in which the sensor of a train vehicle is failed.  
In addition to these sensors malfunctionings, an 
anomalous increase of the friction torque in one of the 
vehicles carbody was simulated to verify the ability of 
the correlation process to detect this condition. 
The simulation campaign showed that sensors 
health management process was able to positively 
recognize all type of malfunctionings.  A summary of 
its performance is presented hereunder. 
 An out of range signal is always detected 
 Minimum change of signal offset necessary to 
recognize a sensor failure is equal to 1.1° starting 
from a two active sensors condition and 1.5° 
starting from a single active sensor condition.  The 
maximum tilt angle error before the failure is 
detected is 1.5° 
 Minimum change of sensor sensitivity  necessary to 
recognize a sensor failure is equal to 30% starting 
from a two active sensors condition and 40% 
starting from a single active sensor condition. The 
maximum tilt angle error before the failure is 
detected is 2.3° 
 Minimum signal instability  necessary to recognize 
a sensor failure for the two active sensor condition 
and the single sensor is equal to 1.1° from 0.2 Hz to 
1 Hz. The maximum tilt angle error before the 
failure is detected is 2.5°  
 An increase of friction torque equal to 300% of 
nominal is necessary to activate a warning of 
anomalous system behaviour.  Though this increase 
looks very large, it could actually occur considering 
the harsh environment for the carbody tilting system 
Two simulations examples are shown in Fig. 15 and 16.  
Figure 15 refer to the case of a normal operating system 
in which a large offset suddenly originates in a tilt angle 
sensor; the monitoring process recognizes the failure.  
Figure 16 also refers to  the case of a large offset 
suddenly originated in a tilt angle sensor, but starting 
from a condition in which the other sensor of the same 
vehicle is already failed; the correlation process 
recognizes the failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The work herein presented was carried out in order to 
define a technique able to recognize the failure of tilt 
angle sensor of a high speed tilting train with minimum 
risk of missed failures and false alarms. This would 
allow an unabated operation of the train tilting system 
after a failure of one of the two sensors of the same 
train vehicle, while the present monitoring system 
Figure 15:  Simulation of the failure case of large sensor 
offset starting from a normal condition. 
Failure detected by the monitoring process 
Figure 16:  Simulation of the failure case of large 
sensor offset when the other sensor of the 
same vehicle is failed.  Failure detected 
by the correlation process 
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disables the tilting operation and reduces the train 
speed after a lack of coherence between the two 
sensors of the same vehicle is detected.   
The sensors health management process described 
in this paper was first tested simulating a train ride 
along two significant tracks over the whole range of 
normal operating conditions and appropriate limits for 
the failure detection were established to prevent false 
alarms.  Then, all types of sensors failures and 
malfunctionings were injected, the ability of the health 
management system to recognize them was positively 
assessed and the maximum transient errors of the tilt 
angle of the vehicle carbody with the failed sensor 
were evaluated.  
The results of the entire simulation campaign 
proved the robustness of the sensors health 
management system and a confidence was hence 
gained in its ability of detecting a sensor failure or 
malfunctioning with minimum risk of false alarms or 
missed failures.  The implementation of such health 
management system on a tilting train will thus enable 
the tilting operation to continue after a first failure of a 
tilt angle sensor of a train vehicle and thus allow the 
train to maintain its high speed travel for the remainder 
of the ride.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
A  =  Actuators area 
b1  =  Moment arm of actuator 1 
b2  =  Moment arm of actuator 2 
i  =  Control current 
i0  =  Disturbance current 
iTH = Current threshold for the servovalve current 
filter 
kV  =  Servovalve flow coefficient 
MW  =  Carbody weight moment 
p1  =  Pressure acting on actuator 1 
p2  =  Pressure acting on actuator 2 
pS  =  Supply pressure 
pR  =  Return pressure 
Q1  =  Flow rate through metering port 1 
Q2  =  Flow rate through metering port 2 
T  =  Total torque developed by the actuators 
TF  =  Friction torque 
γ  =  Carbody tilting angular speed 
γB = Dead band on the tilt rate input error of the 
monitoring process 
γL = Tilt rate threshold γL for activation of the 
learning process 
γM = Tilt rate computed by the system model 
γT =  Measured tilt rate 
ΔϑTH = Lack of coherence threshold for the two 
sensors signals of the same carbody 
δt0  = Persistance time above coherence threshold 
necessary to activate the monitoring process 
ϑ  =  Carbody tilt angle 
ϑTH = Command threshold for activation of the 
correlator function 
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